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ABSTRACT
During the 1990s, human rights and anti-sweatshop activists increased their efforts to improve
working conditions and raise wages for workers in developing countries. These campaigns took
many different forms: direct pressure to change legislation in developing countries, pressure on
firms, newspaper campaigns, and grassroots organizing. This paper analyzes the impact of two
different types of interventions on labor market outcomes in Indonesian manufacturing: (1) direct
US government pressure, which contributed to a doubling of the minimum wage and (2) anti-
sweatshop  campaigns.  The  combined  effects  of  the  minimum  wage  legislation  and  the  anti-
sweatshop campaigns led to a 50 percent increase in real wages and a 100 percent increase in
nominal wages for unskilled workers at targeted plants. We then examine whether higher wages led
firms to cut employment or relocate elsewhere. Although the higher minimum wage reduced
employment  for  unskilled  workers,  anti-sweatshop  activism  targeted  at  textiles,  apparel,  and
footwear plants did not. Plants targeted by activists were more likely to close, but those losses were
offset by employment gains at surviving plants. The message is a mixed one: activism significantly
improved wages for unskilled workers in sweatshop industries, but probably encouraged some plants
to leave Indonesia.
Ann Harrison














  Anti-sweatshop campaigns launched to improve working conditions in poor countries increased 
dramatically in the 1990s.  These campaigns took many different forms: direct pressure to change 
legislation in developing countries, pressure on firms, newspaper campaigns, and grassroots organizing.  
Corporate giants with strong name-brand recognition such as Nike, Reebok, Adidas and the Gap all 
became the focus of extremely well-coordinated ad campaigns and consumer boycotts that spread 
throughout hundreds of college campuses.  Surprisingly, however, there has been almost no research that 
analyzes how anti-sweatshop campaigns have affected the very workers they are designed to assist. 
   This paper examines the impact of US government pressure and anti-sweatshop campaigns on labor 
market outcomes in Indonesia. Indonesia makes an ideal case study because both the United States 
government and human rights organizations pressured the country to improve conditions for workers.  
The pressure took two different forms.   First, the United States government threatened to withdraw 
special tariff privileges for Indonesian exports if the government failed to address human rights issues. 
The Indonesian government responded to US pressure by making the minimum wage a central component 
of its labor market policies in the 1990s.
1  Minimum wages increased by eight hundred percent in nominal 
terms and more than doubled in real terms.   
 A second approach involved grassroots organizing, negative publicity, and consumer awareness 
campaigns for goods produced by footwear and apparel producers.  In the 1990s, international concern 
over globalization and labor standards increased dramatically. Major campaigns against large footwear 
companies such as Nike forced these firms to raise wages, improve working conditions for their workers, 
and sign codes of conduct.   One of the goals of this paper is to compare the effects of government-
mandated wage improvements with the effects of the more unconventional tactic of anti-sweatshop 
activism.  
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To measure the impact of the anti-sweatshop movement on labor market outcomes, we use a 
difference-in-difference approach, comparing wages before and after the advent of the campaigns.  The 
combined effects of the minimum wage legislation and the anti-sweatshop campaigns led to a more than 
50 percent increase in real wages and a doubling of nominal wages for unskilled workers at targeted 
plants.  We then examine whether higher wages led firms to cut employment or relocate elsewhere.  
Despite significant non-compliance, the minimum wage hike reduced employment for unskilled workers 
by as much as 12 percentage points over the period.  Although the higher minimum wage reduced 
employment, anti-sweatshop activism targeted at textiles, apparel, and footwear plants did not.  Some 
plants targeted by activists were more likely to close, but those losses were offset by employment gains at 
surviving plants.  The fact that wages responded to activist pressure without leading to a significant fall in 
employment suggests that anti-sweatshop campaigns in Indonesia were successful in helping the lowest 
paid workers achieve sizeable income gains.  These results suggest that activism had less costly 
consequences for employment in Indonesia than externally imposed US pressure, which contributed to the 
dramatic minimum wage increase.   
Identification for minimum wage effects is based on district-level differences in the application of 
the statutory minimum wage across Indonesia.  Identification for anti-sweatshop effects is achieved by 
comparing the behavior of firms operating in districts where there were subcontractors working for name 
brands (Nike, Rebok and Adidas) relative to firms in districts where subcontractors for those three 
companies did not have operations.  The results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications.  We 
include controls for other factors that could be correlated with wage and employment changes, such as 
foreign ownership and export status, investments in technology, differences in productivity or changing 
profitability resulting from exchange rate fluctuations.  We also control for output shocks that could be 
associated with rising wages in textiles and apparel production. 
 Although other research has shown that foreign enterprises in developing countries are more 
likely to pay higher wages, these previous studies do not directly address the impact of anti-sweatshop   3 
activism.
2   Other related work includes Edmonds and Pavcnik (2001), who explore how rice prices 
affected the use of child labor in Vietnam. Edmonds and Pavcnik find that in rural areas, where most 
people are both rice producers and consumers, the income effect of higher rice prices has greatly 
outweighed the higher opportunity costs of not employing children in the work force, and therefore child 
labor has declined significantly.
3 Previous work has also examined the rationale for labor standards, as 
well as on the determinants of ratification of ILO conventions. 
4 
  The structure of this paper is as follows.  In Section II, we discuss the background for the 
minimum wage increases, present evidence on the development of anti-sweatshop campaigns, discuss the 
identification strategy and set up a framework for estimation.  We present results on wages in Section III.  
Section IV examines the impact of minimum wage legislation and anti-sweatshop activism on 
employment, profits, investment and plant exit, while Section V concludes. 
 
II.  Background, Identification Strategy, and Framework for Estimation 
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3 However, in urban areas, where families are only rice consumers, the effects of the rice exports on price has led to 
increases in child labor since urban incomes have declined. Since Vietnam is predominantly rural, the overall effect 
has been a decline in child labor. 
4  Chau and Kanbur (2001) postulate that if ratification of these conventions were costless, or if the benefits greatly 
outweighed the costs, one would expect complete compliance across countries. Given that this is not the case, Chau 
and Kanbur investigate the determinants of signing. They find little evidence that variables predicted by standard 
economic theory— such as per capita gross domestic product (GDP), degree of openness to trade, or average 
education—are determining factors, but rather that countries with higher domestic standards have a higher 
probability of adoption.
4  Maskus (1996) refutes the argument that a lack of international standards has led to 
significant erosion of low-skilled wages in developed countries, or is a significant determinant of trade performance 
and foreign direct investment throughout the developing world. Maskus also reports evidence regarding the impact 
of labor standards on wages in export processing zones. He claims that overall the zones pay higher wages and have 
better working conditions, but that in some countries the minimum wage is less likely to be enforced in export 
processing zones than in the rest of the country. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that efforts to organize workers in 
export processing zones have been routinely suppressed. Maskus points out that the altruistic reasons echoed in 
much of the developed world for promoting labor standards, even if sincere, are often used as a guise for trade 
protectionism and that natural variability in labor standards is an inevitable result of differing levels of economic, 
social, and cultural development.  He also analyzes the extent to which trade instruments such as tariffs, import 
quotas, and sanctions could potentially be used to enforce international compliance with a minimum set of core 
labor standards, specifically with respect to developing countries. He finds that trade instruments are never first-best 
and that often they exacerbate the problems they are meant to solve (primarily because they often reduce the poorest 
workers’ incomes).  In addition, they can lead to other labor market distortions that decrease overall world welfare. 
He suggests a number of more targeted approaches to address contentious labor issues such as child labor, including 
labeling schemes as well as aid programs focused on education and poverty alleviation. 
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  We begin by describing the role played by the United States in influencing Indonesia’s labor market 
policies.  We then turn to a discussion of the anti-sweatshop movement.  To the extent that anti-sweatshop 
activism also contributed to US government efforts to raise minimum wages in Indonesia, our approach 
provides a lower bound on the impact of the anti-sweatshop movement on wages.  However, separating 
the impact of US government pressure from sweatshop activism is possible because the minimum wage 
increase affected all manufacturing enterprises, while anti-sweatshop activists concentrated on textiles, 
apparel, and footwear factories in a limited geographic area within Indonesia.  This section then describes 
a theoretical framework and discusses the approach to estimation. 
  Pressure from the United States   Between 1987 and 1995, American groups filed seven 
petitions with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) claiming that Indonesian labor rights laws were not 
being enforced by the Indonesian government and that Indonesia’s preferential trade status under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) should be revoked (Caraway 2001). These petitions focused on 
seven major labor rights violations: obstruction of the right to organize, restrictions on civil servants, the 
right to strike, the intervention of security authorities in labor disputes, restrictions of workers'  access to 
appeal, limited sanctions against employers, and unfair restrictions on the right to work. 
  Under the GSP system, participating countries face lower duties (or no duties at all) on their goods 
that are exported to the United States. Therefore, maintaining GSP status is economically important for 
recipient nations, and the threat of revoking it can apply significant pressure on governments to change 
their policies.  One legal basis for revoking GSP status is evidence of human rights violations or violation 
of labor laws. 
  When President Clinton came into office in 1992 the USTR agreed to review Indonesia’s GSP 
status. Although the Indonesian government flatly denied any violations of labor rights, for the next two 
years the Indonesian government took small steps to improve the conditions of workers by easing 
restrictions on unions and promising to enforce higher minimum wages. Although wages were not an 
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issue raised in the GSP petitions, the Indonesian government decided to make improvements on the wage 
front instead of more comprehensive labor rights reform that had been highlighted by the American labor 
rights groups. This also allowed the government to quell rising labor unrest since the major demand in the 
growing number of strikes during this time period (fueled by the reluctance of the Indonesian government 
to crack down while under greater international scrutiny) was compliance with the legally mandated 
minimum wage. Although the U.S. did not revoke Indonesia’s GSP privileges and the USTR’s review 
process waned after Clinton’s 1994 visit to Indonesia, from 1990 through1996 the average daily 
minimum wage in Indonesia increased by more than 800 percent in nominal terms (see Figure 1), and the 
Indonesian government continued to issue promises to more strictly enforce minimum wage compliance. 
  As indicated by Figure 1, minimum wages more than doubled in real terms between 1985 and 
1999 (See also Appendix Table 1). Large increases in the real value of the minimum wage occurred in 
1989 and between 1992 and 1994, coinciding with US threats to withdraw GSP preferences to Indonesia.  
Using the manufacturing census plant-level data for Indonesia, we calculated average production and non-
production worker wages relative to the statutory minimum from 1985 through 1999. As indicated by the 
trends in Figure 1, the ratio of production worker wages to the minimum wage fell from a factor of more 
than 2- to-1 to nearly 1-to-1 in the late 1990s.  Average production-worker wages were hovering just 
above the minimum wage before the 1997 financial crisis.  
  The Anti-Sweatshop Movement  The roots of the anti-sweatshop campaign in Indonesia 
can be traced to a 1989 study commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development.  The 
study, carried out by the Asian American Free Labor Institute-Indonesia under the direction of Jeff 
Ballinger, discovered that of all the factories that produced goods for the export sector, plants that 
manufactured for Nike paid the lowest wages. In 1992 Ballinger’s work appeared in Harper’s Magazine 
in a short piece entitled, “The New Free-Trade Hell: Nike’s profits jump on the backs of Asian workers,” 
and in 1993 CBS featured Ballinger on a report about poor working conditions in Asian factories. 
Organizations such as Global Exchange, Press for Change (founded by Ballinger), and the 
National Labor Committee used the momentum generated from the increasing mainstream media   6 
attention on poor factory conditions in Nike plants to create an international campaign against sweatshop 
conditions in Nike factories. Coupled with their own very effective media strategies, including ads that 
satirized Nike symbols and slogans (e.g. the “swooshtika” in place of the Nike “swoosh” symbol), the 
anti-sweatshop activists waged a public relations war against Nike and other big clothing retailers. The 
movement in the U.S. and Europe was enlivened through electronic forums where young activists 
congregated, shared information at lightning speed, and plotted their course of action.  
Nike established its own “Code of Conduct” in 1992 (Murphy and Matthew 2001) in order to 
comply with labor standards and establish living wages, but these practices were not fully implemented 
until 1995-1996. During this time, NGOs maintained persistent and steady appraisals of working 
conditions in and around Nike factories in order to hold the company to account for its poor treatment of 
workers.  The campaign against Nike in Indonesia was essentially a media campaign, which operated 
(and continues to operate) through contacts with newspaper columnists (such as for the New York 
Times), magazine writers (for Harpers), TV shows, and other outlets which could be used to attract 
attention to the plight of Indonesian workers.  US grass roots organizations were enlisted on a number of 
occasions to bring ex-factory workers from Nike factories in Indonesia to speak in the USA on well-
advertised tours about conditions there.  The primary focus on Nike, with less emphasis on Reebok and 
Adidas, can be explained by the fact that these three giants have accounted for over 50 percent of the 
global market share in sportswear apparel and footwear since the late 1990s.  Nike, in particular, provided 
a perfect centerpiece for the anti-sweatshop campaigns since the Nike symbol was highly recognizable 
and the company had a popular athlete, Michael Jordon, as its spokesman.  
The campaign against Nike’s subcontractors in the 1990s focused almost exclusively on 
Indonesia.  Why?  Indonesia currently has the second largest number of subcontractors for Nike apparel 
and footwear in the world.  Although China now leads the list in terms of number of subcontracting 
factories for Nike, Indonesia was the focus of the campaign against Nike in the 1990s for several reasons.  
First, much of the research which documented poor working conditions and low minimum wage 
compliance that fueled the campaigns had been completed by Jeff Ballinger while working for the AFL-  7 
CIO there; there was no comparable work being done in China at that time.  Second, there was significant 
anger directed against the foreign (primarily Korean) owners of these factories within Indonesia, which 
helped to fuel local concerns.  The relatively more open political atmosphere (compared to China) also 
contributed to the ability of US groups to work with local NGOs in Indonesia.  The use of the internet and 
email to collect information and publicize concerns cannot be underestimated. 
To summarize, the “treatment” began with a series of studies on foreign and export-oriented 
subcontractors in Indonesia, and culminated with negative publicity regarding wages and working 
conditions through a variety of channels, including major newspapers, websites, speaking engagements, 
and television coverage.  One way to gauge the extent of this newfound interest is to count the number of 
articles about labor standards that appeared in major newspapers in the 1990s. As figure 2 demonstrates, 
the number of articles about sweatshop and child labor activities increased dramatically. There was a 300 
percent increase in the number of articles regarding child labor, and the number of articles focusing on 
sweatshop activities increased by more than 400 percent. 
  If  we  restrict  the  analysis  to  articles about  sweatshops  in  Indonesia alone,  the  trends  are  very 
similar.  In Figure 3 we computed the ratio of the number of articles on sweatshops or child labor relative 
to the number of articles on economic issues which appeared on Indonesia in major newspapers around 
the world.  The trend identified in Figure 3 is quite clear: while there were no articles on these issues at 
the beginning of the decade, interest in sweatshop conditions rapidly increased, peaking in 1996.  In 1997 
there was an increasing shift in focus towards the financial crisis, which erupted at the end of 1997.  
Interest in child labor and sweatshop labor fell in 1997 and 1998—at least relative to other issues of 
economic interest--but has been increasing again in the last several years.       
  Further evidence regarding development of anti-sweatshop activism can be found in Elliott and 
Freeman (2003).  The authors systematically trace the development of these campaigns in the 1990s.  
Their book makes clear that the overwhelming majority of new organizations created to address labor 
conditions in sweatshop industries were formed in the early 1990s.  Why did interest in these issues   8 
increase so rapidly in the mid-1990s?
5  In 1996-1997, there were a series of high profile exposes on Nike, 
Gap, Walmart, Disney and others.  For instance, in the second quarter of 1996 the Kathie Lee Gifford 
sweatshop scandal was highlighted in the news.  These exposes were picked up by student movements on 
campuses.   Student groups staged protests and sit-ins and subsequently kept these issues in the news, and 
contributed to the creation of groups designed to respond to sweatshop problems. The convergence of 
high profile exposes, student activism, and the creation of new groups designed to address anti-sweatshop 
concerns fueled the increase in newspaper coverage.  Post-1996, the shift in focus towards the Asian 
financial crisis contributed to a decline in interest in these issues.  The student movement also weakened 
and moved on to other issues.  
  Identification Issues  The identification strategy for this paper must address two problems: 
first, how to identify the independent impact of changes in the minimum wage; and second, how to 
measure the role of anti-sweatshop activism.  The identification strategy for minimum wage effects 
exploits the fact that minimum wage increases in Indonesia were not uniform across districts.  Figure 4 
shows the trends in minimum wages for districts with the highest and lowest increases in minimum wages 
between 1985 and 1999.  It is clear from the graphs that statutory minimum wages were almost flat in the 
second half of the 1980s, and that increases did not occur until 1989-1990, when the US government 
began to pressure Indonesia to improve working conditions.  The figures also show that the rate of 
nominal increase in minimum wages varied dramatically across regions; while the minimum wage 
increased by almost 400 percent in district facing the lowest increase, it increased by over 1000 percent in 
the district facing the biggest (percentage) statutory increase.  In many cases, these different trajectories 
for statutory wage increases occurred in neighboring districts.  These divergent patterns in the statutory 
minimum wage did not begin until 1989 or 1990, allowing us to compare pre and post-wage increases to 
identify the specific impact of the minimum wage legislation. 
  To control for the fact that price levels may have evolved differently across different parts of 
Indonesia, we control for overall regional minimum wage changes and only exploit differences within the 
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same region in the evolution of the minimum wage.  For example, we exploit differences in the evolution 
of the statutory minimum wage across districts within East Java or West Java, but do not use differences 
between the two provinces for identification. 
  Our identification strategy for anti-sweatshop activism exploits the fact that activists concentrated 
on subcontractors for the 3 most highly visible footwear and apparel companies: Nike, Adidas, and 
Reebok.  This means that activism was geographically concentrated in areas where these companies (or 
their subcontractors) operated.  Nike, Adidas, and Reebok have made available on the internet all the 
locations of their subcontractors in Indonesia.  This makes it possible to identify the specific districts in 
which companies targeted by activists operated in the 1990s.  Consequently, our identification strategy for 
activism is to compare the evolution of wages and employment in textiles, footwear, and apparel factories 
in regions with Nike, Adidas, and Reebok operations, relative to other regions.   Unfortunately, 
confidentiality restrictions do not permit us to identify the actual contractors in our census data.  
However, by comparing different factories within the same sector, we are able to control for demand or 
supply shocks which could affect all operations within the same industry. 
  To give us a preliminary indication of whether the treatment group was affected by anti-
sweatshop activism, Figure 5 examines the evolution of wages for all plants with foreign ownership or 
export activity in the textiles, footwear, and apparel sector.  The figure shows the distribution of wages for 
these kinds of enterprises in districts without anti-sweatshop activity and those with anti-sweatshop 
activity.  The benefits of examining the distribution of wages across all enterprises is that we can better 
identify the impact on plants in the lower wage deciles. 
  In 1990, prior to the onset of activism, TFA plants with foreign ownership or export activity in 
the treated districts paid somewhat less than in other districts.  The distribution of log wages was quite 
broad, reflecting in part the fact that there was no binding wage floor, the government’s minimum wages 
were not particularly high, and enforcement was lax.  However, by 1996, the picture had changed 
considerably.  The wage distribution for unskilled workers is now much narrower, reflecting a squeeze on   10 
the top and bottom parts of the wage distribution due to the minimum wage increases between 1990 and 
1996. 
  Equally remarkable is the shift in the wage distribution for the treatment group relative to textiles 
and apparel firms in other districts.  While plants in the treatment group were paying less than other 
similar plants in 1990, by 1996 the peak had shifted to the right of the control group, indicating that these 
firms were now paying more.  Of equal  interest is the shift in the lower tails of the distribution for the 
treatment group, relative to the control.  The lower tail of the wage distribution on the left-hand side of 
the graph has shrunk significantly for the treatment group relative to other textiles and apparel firms with 
exports or foreign participation.  These significant shifts in the distribution of wages are consistent with 
(but do not prove) increasing importance of minimum wage legislation and anti-sweatshop activity. 
 
Framework for Estimation  Figure 1 shows that as the statutory minimum wage increased, the 
proportion of plants paying at least the minimum declined significantly. While three-quarters of all plants 
paid average wages above the statutory minimum wage in their district to production workers in the mid-
1980s, by 1999 only about half of all plants paid average wages that exceeded the statutory regional 
minimum.  It is clear from Figure 1 that firms in Indonesia did not always comply with the new minimum 
wage legislation.    Although compliance with minimum wages is typically high in developed countries 
today, in developing countries such as Indonesia compliance with minimum wages can be as low as 40 
percent.  Consequently, the firm must decide whether or not to pay the minimum wage.  The firm’s 
choices are similar in the context of anti-sweatshop campaigns. Faced with the possibility of a negative ad 
campaign, the firm must weigh the costs of paying higher wages against the potential negative publicity 
that may result if they do not. 
  A proper framework for evaluating a firm’s decision to raise wages either in the context of a 
rising minimum wage or increasing human rights activism would take into account both the costs and 
benefits of  setting wages above the market-clearing level.  One of the earliest papers which explicitly 
models a firm’s decision whether to comply with a minimum wage is Ashenfelter and Smith (1979).    11 
Given a probability ￿ of being caught and a penalty F, then expected profits if the firm fails to comply 
with minimum wage legislation are given by E(￿) = (1-￿) ￿(w,r,p) + ￿ ￿(M,r,p) – ￿F.  Product prices are 
given by p and other factor prices by r.  The minimum wage is M and w is the unconstrained wage.  The 
employer will decide against compliance if the expected value of ignoring the law exceeds the cost of 
complying: E(￿ (w,r,p)) – ￿(M,r,p) = (1- ￿)[￿ (w,r,p) – ￿(M,r,p)] – ￿F > 0.  In words, a profit-maximizing 
employer will choose not to comply with a minimum wage if the gains from disobeying the law outweigh 
the potential costs of non-compliance.  Using a second order Taylor expansion, we can show that firms 
will choose to comply with minimum wage legislation if 
 
G/L – (M – w) + (1/2w)[M-w]
2e> 0           (1) 
 
G is a positive function of the probability of detection ￿ and a negative function of the penalty F, L is 
the number of employees in the firm, M is the minimum wage, and w is the average wage paid by the 
firm.  The value e is the elasticity of demand for labor and is less than zero.  Equation (1) suggests that 
firms would comply with minimum wage legislation if the expected penalty from violating the law, given 
by G/L, exceeds the additional compensation, given by the difference M-w, that needs to be paid to each 
employee when the firm complies with the minimum wage. As indicated by equation (1), firms are more 
likely to comply with minimum wage legislation if the probability of detection is high or the penalty is 
high, if the minimum wage M is low, or if the firm pays high wages.  Since a large number of employees 
reduces the per employee cost of compliance in terms of the penalty F per worker, large firms are also 
less likely to comply, after controlling for the probability of detection and other factors.   
A linearized version of Equation (1) which allows for region-specific effects (r) suggests the 
following general empirical specification for an establishment i in region r and time t: 
 
Xirt =   a1 + a2Mrt + a3wrt + ￿4G(u,F)it + ￿5Lit +  ￿6Zirt + rr + eit       (2)   
         12 
Equation (2) could be estimated in a number of different ways.  For example, X could be defined as an 
indicator variable equal to 0 if the establishment fails to comply with the minimum wage, and equal to 1 if 
the firm complies.  This could be estimated using a probit specification or a linear probability model.  
Another possibility—which allows us to capture the whole wage distribution—is to define the outcome 
variable X as the change in wages or percentage change in wages between period t-1 and period t.   
Estimating (2) requires information on minimum wages M, the wage w that would have been paid 
in the absence of minimum wage regulations, employment L, measures of the probability of detection (u)  
and penalties associated with non-compliance (F).  Compliance should increase with w and should fall as 
M rises.  The framework also suggests that compliance or wage growth is likely to rise as the probability 
of detection and penalties for noncompliance increase.  We would also need to control for differences in 
types of workers; we will index labor quality by a vector Z.  Minimum wages in Indonesia vary across 
districts (indexed by r) and over time (indexed by t); these are available from the government.   Since w is 
the wage which would have prevailed in the absence of minimum wage legislation, w is normally not 
observed.   In addition, w is also likely to be endogenous with respect to M.  Consequently, we allow w to 
be captured by observables M, region, and industry dummies.  Adding a measure of w based on wages for 
firms which fail to comply with the minimum wage as a proxy does not in any case affect the results 
reported in this paper. 
  For Indonesia, there is no existing evidence on the probability of detection.  It also appears that for 
domestic firms in the 1980s, the penalty F for non-compliance was probably close to zero.
6 However, as 
human rights activism and anti-sweatshop organizations proliferated, the probability of detection and the 
penalty F for paying low wages or failing to adhere to the minimum wage increased, particularly for firms 
with high visibility such as large multinationals or well established exporters. The higher probability of 
detection  resulted  from  the  additional  scrutiny  placed  on  these  firms  in  the  1990s,  while  the  higher 
penalty is indicative of the greater costs to multinationals of acquiring a poor image regarding compliance 
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with labor standards.  To capture the impact of anti-sweatshop campaigns on wage setting behavior, we 
propose making G(F,u) a function of export status and foreign ownership, defined at the beginning of the 
sample period.  Consequently, we define export status EXP and foreign ownership FOR as dummy 
variables equal to one if the establishment exported some of its output or had some foreign ownership in 
1990 and continued to do so over the entire period. 
  To capture the effect of the treatment, which in this case is the anti-sweatshop movement which 
focused on the highly visible companies of Nike, Reebok, and Adidas, we create a dummy variable called 
TREATMENT equal to one if both of the following are true: 
 
  (1) The plant was producing textiles, footwear or apparel (TFA) at the beginning of the period 
  (2) The plant operated in the districts which had subcontractors for Nike, Reebok, or Adidas. 
 
  We allow the impact of activism to vary depending on whether the subcontractor is a foreign or 
exporting enterprise, leading to the following specification: 
  
Xirt =   a1 + ￿2Mrt  + b1EXPit0  + b2FORit0+ b3TREATMENT it0 + b4(EXP*TREATMENT) it0 + 
b5 (FOR*TREATMENT) it0 + a4Lit +  ￿5Zirt + rr + eit          (3)   
 
The vector Z includes a number of factors which could be correlated with FOR and EXP, and are likely 
to affect X.  This includes worker characteristics and other firm characteristics such as capital intensity.  
As  indicated  in  Figure  1,  compliance  is  a  much  more  serious  problem  for  production  workers.  
Consequently, the results of estimating (3) will be reported primarily for production workers.  Some years 
in the survey include additional information on employee education and experience.  When available, 
these will also be included. Estimation will also take into account the possibility of region-specific effects 
captured in (3) by rr.        14 
To give the reader an idea of the importance of textiles, apparel, and footwear in the 
manufacturing sector in Indonesia in the 1990s, Figure 6 shows the share of TFA in overall production 
(unskilled worker) employment.  Textiles, footwear and apparel employees increased from 25 percent to 
account for 35 percent of all unskilled workers in manufacturing employment during the period.  The 
percentage of unskilled workers employed by foreign TFA plants rose from 2 percent to over 5 percent, 
while the percentage of unskilled workers employed by exporting plants increased from 5 percent to 
nearly 20 percent of all unskilled employment in manufacturing.  This graph highlights the major 
importance of textiles, apparel, and footwear plants for manufacturing employment. 
  
III.  Wages and Anti-Sweatshop Activism in Indonesia 
Data Summary   
The data for this analysis comes from the annual manufacturing survey of Indonesia collected and 
compiled by the Indonesian government’s statistical agency BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik). The completion 
of this survey is mandatory under Indonesian law for firms with more than 20 employees and therefore 
the data captures almost the entire population of Indonesian manufacturing firms, which ranged from 
approximately 13,000 in 1990 to over 18,000 in 1999. The survey includes over 400 questions in any 
given year, the large majority of which remain constant although in certain periods additional questions 
are included and others removed.  Over the ten year period there is an average of 4.5 observations per 
firm, reflecting both the fact that some firms go out of business while others enter, as well as changing 
reporting requirements. 
We begin by reporting mean wages in the manufacturing sector in 1990 and 1996 (Table 1).  We 
focus on this period because information on export orientation was not collected before 1990, and the 
financial crisis which erupted in 1997 makes any evaluations post-1996 problematic.  In addition, 
information on worker characteristics is only available during the mid-1990s.  Since the minimum wage 
applies only to base wages, we define the plant’s average wage as basic compensation (salary) divided by 
the number of workers in that skill category.  For the remainder of the analysis, we focus almost   15 
exclusively on production worker wages as a measure of unskilled wages.  As indicated earlier, we have 
chosen not to focus on skilled worker wages, which were on average two and a half to four times higher 
than the legislated minimum wage during the 1990s (see Figure 1).     
  The first column of Table 1 reports the average production worker wage in 1990 and in 1996, and 
the difference between 1990 and 1996. The third row reports the difference for all plants, while the fourth 
row reports the difference in wages between 1990 and 1996 only for plants which were present in both 
years.  All wages are reported in thousands of 1996 Indonesian rupiahs.  Based on an exchange rate of 
about 2,000 rupiahs to the dollar in 1996,   average production worker wages in domestic enterprises 
increased from about 550 US dollars to 750 US dollars between 1990 and 1996.   Column (2) reports 
wages for foreign owned enterprises, while column (3) reports wages for exporters.  As discussed earlier, 
foreign and exporting status is defined based on information at the beginning of the sample period.  In 
1990, firms with foreign equity paid three times the wages of domestic enterprises, averaging 1500 US 
dollars per worker.  By 1996, the gap had narrowed: foreign firms paid only twice as much as domestic 
enterprises.  Exporters also paid higher wages than firms producing solely for the domestic market: about 
50 percent more in both 1990 and 1996.  These significant differences in pay levels between domestic 
enterprises, foreign firms, and exporters suggest very different levels of compliance with minimum 
wages, even at the onset of our study. 
Rows 3 and 4 of Table 1 examine the change in wages between 1990 and 1996 while in rows 5 
and 6 we report the results in logs.  Across all enterprises, wages grew more quickly for domestic than for 
exporting or foreign enterprises.   While real wages for domestic enterprises increased by over thirty 
percent, real wages for foreign or exporting enterprises grew less.  Columns (4) through (6) present the 
“difference-in-differences”, which is the difference in the change in wages across domestic, foreign and 
exporting plants.  The difference in difference between domestic and foreign or exporting enterprises is 
generally negative and statistically significant, indicating faster wage growth for domestically owned, 
non-exporting enterprises.    16 
However, the story is completely different for firms producing textiles, footwear or apparel 
(TFA).  Table 1B decomposes the sample into TFA and non-TFA establishments.  The first three columns 
report average wages for domestic, foreign and exporting TFA plants, while the last three columns report 
those same averages for non-TFA plants. Across domestic TFA and non-TFA plants, wages are 
remarkably similar; although wages are slightly lower in TFA plants, the difference is not statistically 
significant in 1990.  These results are reassuring because they suggest that the composition of workers in 
domestic TFA and non-TFA plants was not much different at the beginning of the sample period.   
However, both foreign and exporting enterprises paid their unskilled workers significantly less in TFA 
plants than in other sectors.  In 1990, workers in foreign TFA plants were paid half as much as workers at 
other foreign plants; exporters in TFA plants paid their workers 30 percent less.  These large differences 
may have been one factor that contributed to the focus of anti-sweatshop activists on workers in textiles, 
apparel, and footwear plants. 
  By 1996, the gap between TFA and non-TFA plants had narrowed considerably, particularly 
among exporters.    In 1996, the difference in wages between TFA and non-TFA plants amounted to only 
23 dollars per employee per year; the difference—computed in column (9)—is not statistically significant.  
The gap between foreign and non-foreign wages also narrowed, but by less: foreign firms continued to 
pay about 1,500,000 Rupiahs or 750 dollars more per worker in total salary in1996 (see row 2, column 
(8)).   Although domestic TFA and non-TFA plants continued to pay similar wages, domestic TFA plants 
received smaller wage increases than workers in other sectors.  This suggests that the wage benefits from 
anti-sweatshop activism were limited to workers in export-oriented or foreign-owned plants. 
  Rows (3) and (4) report the wage growth from 1990 to 1996 in levels; rows (5) and (6) report the 
wage growth in logs.  The difference-in-difference, ie the difference in wage growth across TFA and non-
TFA plants, is reported in columns (7), (8) and (9).  The results show that wage increases for textile and 
apparel workers were significantly higher in exporting and foreign-owned establishments.  Again, the 
only exception is for workers in domestic plants selling only to the domestic market: in these plants, 
wages for TFA workers increased by 7 percentage points less than for unskilled workers in other sectors.    17 
  The results in Table 1 suggest very different patterns of wage growth for textile, apparel, and 
footwear plants in the 1990s.  While unskilled workers in other exporting and foreign owned plants 
generally received smaller wage increases than the rest of the manufacturing labor force in the 1990s, the 
opposite was true for workers in textiles and apparel factories.  One likely reason is that exporters and 
multinational firms outside of textiles and apparel factories already paid higher wages and consequently 
did not have to increase wages as much to remain in compliance with minimum wage legislation.  
However, in TFA plants, unskilled wages grew 30 to 40 percent in real terms between 1990 and 1996.  
None of the means in Table 1 control for plant characteristics, which could possibly explain 
differential wage growth.  For example, wage growth could differ due to plant characteristics such as 
changes in size, capital intensity, productivity growth, profitability, and other factors.  Wages could also 
differ due to differences in educational levels of workers.  Table 2 presents the results of estimating 
equation (3).  The dependent variable is the change in the log wage between 1990 and 1996.  The 
minimum wage gap is defined as the log of the minimum wage in the district where the plant operated in 
1996 less the log of the minimum wage in 1990.  If that difference is negative, the gap is set equal to zero.   
The first row includes only ownership dummies for foreign ownership, export activities, and 
participation in the treatment group, as well as interactions between TREATMENT,  foreign ownership 
and export orientation.  Foreign ownership, export status, and sector are defined based on the beginning 
of the period, to avoid endogeneity of ownership.  More specifically, firms are considered to be foreign if 
they were at least 10 percent foreign-owned over the entire period.  Firms are considered to be exporters 
if at least 10 percent of their sales were exported over the entire period.  Initially we only include plants 
that were present in all years of the sample, which is necessary for long-difference estimation. The results 
are consistent with the difference-in-differences presented in Table 1: while wages in most foreign-owned 
or exporting plants did not increase faster than in other plants, establishments in the treatment group with 
foreign ownership were the exception.  The coefficient on treatment for foreign enterprises varies 
between .18 and .22.  Controlling for the impact of minimum wage changes, the results suggest that 
wages in foreign treatment plants grew from 18 to 22 percent faster than in other plants.   18 
The coefficient on the minimum wage, which is equal to .67 when all controls are added, suggests 
that a 1 percent increase in the real value of the minimum wage led to a .67 percent increase in the real 
unskilled wage.  The coefficient on the minimum wage gap is robust to the addition of a number of plant 
and region controls, as the results in column (6) indicate.  It is possible to add region controls because the 
minimum wage is set at a level more disaggregated than that of the region: at the district level.  Given a 
mean value of .5 for the minimum wage gap across all enterprises included in the estimation, the 
coefficient implies that minimum wage increases accounted for about a 35 percent increase in real wages.  
Columns (2) through (6) in Table 2 add a number of controls to the basic specification.  In the second 
column we add controls for plant and worker characteristics, including log changes in real material inputs, 
the real value of the reported capital stock, and plant size (defined as the total number of employees).  We 
also add details on educational attainment for employees at the individual plant.  In the years 1995 
through 1997, the survey included questions regarding the educational attainment of the plant’s labor 
force.  The addition of plant characteristics and controls for educational attainment does not change the 
magnitude and significance of the coefficients on Foreign*TREATMENT or the minimum wage.   
The next four columns add region controls, total factor productivity, technology expenditures, 
and output growth.  There are several alternative explanations for the increase in wages for foreign 
enterprises: first, foreign owners may have invested in plants with higher productivity; previous studies 
suggest that foreign ownership is associated with higher productivity.  Consequently, we redo the 
analysis, controlling for plant-level productivity growth, using total factor productivity growth (TFPG) as 
our measure of productivity.  Second, foreign owned enterprises might have experienced a positive 
demand shock relative to other enterprises.  The addition of productivity growth and output growth 
controls for this possibility.  Third, wages in foreign TREATMENT plants might have increased due to 
investments in new technology; adding technology expenditures controls for this possibility.  The results 
are robust to the inclusion of all these controls. 
Column (7) tests whether firms cut non-wage benefits to offset the higher wages induced by 
minimum wage changes and activist pressure.  The results show that although foreign firms and exporters   19 
offset wage increases with reductions in non-wage benefits, treatment firms did not.  The coefficients on 
Foreign*TREATMENT and Exporting*TREATMENT are zero and not significant.  However, exporters 
in general did partially compensate for higher wages by cutting non-wage benefits.  Exporters cut non-
wage benefits by seventy-six percent, suggesting that firms did respond to increasing minimum wages by 
cutting other benefits.   Column (8) reports the results when wages and non-wage benefits are added 
together.  Since wages account for most of the income for unskilled workers, the results are very similar 
in magnitude to those reported in the first six columns of the table. 
  Column (9) of Table 2 restricts the sample to large plants (with at least 100 employees) producing 
only textiles, apparel or footwear products.  This sample allows us to compare the evolution of wages for 
plants of a similar size, producing the same types of goods.  If unobserved output or price shocks 
differentially affected this sector, then we can achieve identification by only comparing plants producing 
the same types of goods in districts with and without Nike subcontractors.  The results are robust to this 
additional test: again, wages in the affected districts increased by twenty percentage points more in real 
terms than in other districts, after controlling for minimum wage increases, plant and worker 
characteristics, output growth, and technical change.  Finally, column (10) reports the results of 
estimating the same specification for non-production workers.  If an unobserved positive demand shock 
led textile and apparel workers in the treatment districts to increase wages, we should observe the same 
wage increase for skilled workers in these factories.  The results in column (10) show that this is not the 
case.  There were no significant wage increases for skilled workers in exporting or foreign enterprises in 
treatment districts. 
Table 3 presents additional robustness tests.  The first three columns replace the dummy variable 
for textiles, apparel, and footwear (TFA) plants with other sectors, including chemical products (column 
(1)), wood products (column (2)), and fabricated metal enterprises (column (3)).  In contrast to TFA 
employers in the affected districts, foreign and exporting employers from other sectors who operated in 
the treatment districts exhibited significantly lower wage growth than other similar plants.   In column (4), 
we randomize the treatment districts.  If the treatment district is assigned at random, instead of only   20 
targeting those districts with Nike subcontractors, there is no longer any evidence of positive wage 
pressure.  The coefficient on the treatment dummy, as well as the treatment interacted with foreign or 
exporter, is close to zero in magnitude and statistically insignificant.  The first four columns of Table 3 
indicate that the significant effects of activism are restricted to only plants in the textiles, apparel, and 
footwear industry operating in those districts where there was anti-sweatshop activity. 
We perform one more test of robustness using nonlinear matching techniques.  While a number of 
approaches are possible for estimating treatment effects using non-linear matching techniques, we adopt a 
procedure using nearest neighbor matching as outlined by Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004).  
This approach allows us estimate average treatment effects of anti-sweatshop activism on wage growth, 
using as controls those firms which match most closely those firms that have been treated.  To identify the 
most appropriate control group (the “nearest neighbor”), one must specify a list of covariates.  For the 
treatment effects reported in Table 3, we included as our set of covariates all the controls reported in the 
first six columns of Table 2.  Enterprises in the control group were matched to the treatment group on the 
basis of minimum wage changes, size, output growth, growth in capital stock, growth in material inputs, 
province, educational attainment of the work force, productivity growth, and expenditure on research and 
development. 
It is not possible in the context of matching estimation to allow for multiple treatment effects 
simultaneously.  Consequently, in columns (5) and (7) we estimate the impact of treatment on wage 
growth for foreign TFA plants in the districts with anti-sweatshop activism, but we cannot use nonlinear 
matching techniques to simultaneously measure the impact of foreign ownership, export activity, and 
treatment districts on wage growth, as we did in the OLS specifications.  Nevertheless, the results in 
Table 2 show that the coefficients on ownership, export status and TREATMENT status alone are 
insignificant in explaining wage growth between 1990 and 1996 once we add the full set of controls.  
Consequently, estimating the impact of TREATMENT*Foreign should not be biased due to the omission 
of separate effects for TREATMENT or Foreign. We use the same approach in columns (6) and (8) to 
measure the impact of treatment on TFA exporters. The impact of activism on wages estimated using   21 
nonlinear matching is remarkably similar to the OLS results reported in Table 2.  Anti-sweatshop activism 
raised wages between 19 and 27 percent in real terms, which is consistent with the magnitudes reported 
earlier.  The results are comparable whether we include all plants as possible controls (columns 5 and 6), 
or restrict the treatment and the control group to textiles, apparel, and footwear only (columns 7 and 8). 
The results in Tables 1 through 3 suggest that wages increased systematically more for exporting 
and foreign TFA plants in treatment districts relative to other plants with similar characteristics.  In 
addition to the 35 percent increase in real wages induced by the minimum wage changes, real wages rose 
an additional twenty to twenty five percent more between 1990 and 1996 for TFA exporters.  This 
suggests that combined effects of the minimum wage legislation and the anti-sweatshop campaigns led a 
more than 50 percent increase in real wages and a doubling in nominal wages for unskilled workers in 
targeted exporting or foreign plants (see Appendix Table 1.A for real versus nominal values). Below, we 
explore whether these wage gains had other possibly adverse effects.  For example, these wage gains may 
have led to employment losses and falling investment, or caused plants to shut down operations in 
Indonesia. 
 
IV Other Outcomes: Employment, Profits, Investment, Entry and Exit 
Employment The orthodox approach to minimum wages suggests that an increase in mandated 
wages should lead to a fall in employment, as employers are driven up their labor demand curve.  Prior to 
the 1990s, standard textbook treatments of minimum wages reported that imposing a wage floor would 
lead to adverse consequences for employment.  However, a series of influential studies (1994, 1995) 
published by David Card and Alan Krueger in the 1990s changed the debate on the employment effects of 
minimum wages.  In their book, Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, 
Card and Krueger argue that the imposition of a minimum wage need not have negative employment 
consequences if there are imperfections in the labor market.  These imperfections include the following 
possibilities: (1) the existence of monopsony employers (2) search costs for employers and (3) efficiency 
wages.  If any of these three imperfections characterize the local labor market, an increase in the   22 
minimum wage (or an increase in compliance with the existing minimum wage) could lead to an increase 
or no change in employment.  Card and Krueger document this with a series of papers which examine 
exogenous increases in minimum wages across US states. 
  This unorthodox finding, which has caused an enormous debate among labor economists, has 
interesting implications for labor market policies in developing countries.  If policy makers can raise 
wages by increasing the statutory minimum or encouraging compliance with the existing minimum 
without increasing unemployment, then minimum wage policies could become a powerful tool for 
combating poverty.  This was precisely the thinking behind a 1995 World Bank Report which strongly 
recommended the introduction of a national minimum wage to reduce poverty in Trinidad and Tobago. 
  One consequence of this debate in the United States has been to encourage a number of new 
studies on the impact of minimum wages on employment in developing countries.  Strobl and Walsh 
(2000) examine the impact of a national minimum wage introduced in Trinidad and Tobago in 1998, Bell 
(1997) examines the impact of minimum wages in Columbia and Mexico, and Maloney and Nunez (2000) 
examine the impact of minimum wages in eight Latin American countries.  Rama (1999) and SMERU 
(2001) also examine the impact of the rising minimum wage on employment in Indonesia. 
  The results are mixed.  For example, Bell (1997) finds that minimum wages in Columbia led to 
employment declines, while the minimum wage in Mexico had no impact on employment.  Strobl and 
Walsh (2000) find inconclusive effects for Trinidad and Tobago, in part because the minimum wage was 
not enforced.  All these studies uncover widespread evidence of lack of compliance.  In Honduras, for 
example, which has a very high minimum wage relative to average wages, the minimum wage appears to 
have had no impact on the wage distribution. 
  In Table 4, we repeat the type of analysis presented in Table 1 and use the difference-in-
differences (DID) approach adopted by Card and Krueger (1995) to examine the impact of minimum 
wages on employment in Indonesia.  We focus on the changes in employment between 1990 and 1996, 
which was the period of the large rise in both the magnitude and compliance with the minimum wage.  
The first column reports the number of production workers in 1990 and in 1996, and the difference   23 
between 1990 and 1996. The third row reports the difference for all plants, while the fourth row reports 
the difference in employment between 1990 and 1996 only for plants with data on employment in both 
years.  Across domestic enterprises, the mean number of employees fell slightly, from an average of 69 
employees per plant to an average of 67 employees per plant.  Columns (2) and (3) show that employment 
growth for unskilled workers was concentrated in foreign-owned and exporting enterprises.  Between 
1990 and 1996, average unskilled employment increased from 360 workers to 507 workers per plant for 
foreign enterprises.  For exporters, plants which remained in the sample the whole period gained 200 
employees on average, while those that entered later or exited the sample lost employees.  For the 
balanced sample, reported in rows (4) and (6), employment gains were significantly higher among the 
foreign owned and exporting enterprises.  Across all enterprises (reported in rows 3 and 5), domestic 
plants lost employment while foreign plants gained employment.   
The bottom half of Table 4 reports those same differences for TFA and non-TFA plants.  As in 
the earlier DID calculations, columns (7) through (9) report the “difference-in-differences”, which is the 
difference in the change in employment across TFA and non-TFA firms between 1990 and 1996.  As 
indicated in the bottom half of Table 4, the difference-in-differences is positive, suggesting that compared 
to the change in employment across other types of enterprises between 1990 and 1996, the change in 
employment for exporting or foreign TFA plants was larger.  Focusing on rows (3) and (4) and columns 
(8) and (9), we see that exporting and foreign TFA plants increased employment by 300 to 400 workers 
more than other plants.  The results in Table 4 suggest that increased vigilance vis-à-vis textiles and 
apparel enterprises did not appear to hurt their employment, at least relative to growth in employment of 
other types of enterprises. 
  Table 5 repeats the analysis in a regression context.  With or without controls, the results are 
consistent across specifications.  There is no evidence that the differential wage increases for 
multinationals and exporters in the treatment group led to employment declines.  The coefficients on 
Foreign*TREATMENT and Exporting*TREATMENT are positive and sometimes significant.    There is 
no evidence that higher wage growth negatively affected employment in foreign enterprises, exporting   24 
enterprises, or textiles and apparel producers.  In fact, it is clear from the tables that employment   growth 
was generally higher for exporters and foreign enterprises, including those operating in districts where 
anti-sweatshop activists targeted Nike, Reebok, and Adidas subcontractors.  
However, the results in Table 5 show a robust and negative impact of the minimum wage increase on 
employment growth.  In column (1), the coefficient on the minimum wage increase is -.14, which 
suggests that a 100 percentage point increase in the minimum wage would be accompanied by a 14 
percentage point decline in employment.  The different specifications presented in columns (2) through 
(7) suggest that a 100 percentage point increase in the real minimum wage would be accompanied by 
employment declines of 12 to 18 percent.  In light of the fact that mean increase in the real minimum 
wage gap for the plants included in the sample was over 50 percent, these employment responses 
represent very important effects.  The only enterprises not affected by the rising minimum were small 
plants, defined as enterprises with fewer than 100 employees, where rates of compliance with the 
legislation were much lower.  The significant negative impact on employment for larger enterprises needs 
to be seriously considered in any campaign to increase the mandated minimum wage or to increase 
compliance with the minimum wage.
7 
 As a final check, we redo the analysis of employment using annual data instead of the long difference 
panel. We include both the balanced panel (in column (9)) and the unbalanced panel (column(8)).    As 
before, there are no significant effects of anti-sweatshop activism on employment changes from year to 
year.  The negative and significant impact of the minimum wage on employment is consistent with the 
long difference results, suggesting a fall in employment of almost one percentage point per year due to 
minimum wage increases alone.   
Our results suggest that while minimum wage increases generated employment losses across all of 
manufacturing, anti-sweatshop activism targeted at textiles, apparel, and footwear did not.  Trends in 
aggregate employment for TFA and non-TFA firms confirm this.  In Figure 7, we show total unskilled 
                                                            
7  Indonesia, however, is an unusual case: most countries do not experience 100 percent real increases in the 
value of the minimum wage over a five year period.   25 
employment in Indonesia during the sample period.  Employment growth for the textiles, apparel, and 
footwear sector clearly mirrors the rest of the manufacturing sector; in fact, employment growth was more 
robust during 1990 through 1996.  These aggregate trends are consistent with the regression results 
reported in Table 5.   
Output Growth, Investment, Productivity, and Profits  The evidence in Tables 1 
through 5 points to strong positive effects of anti-sweatshop campaigns on wage growth for production 
workers, with no adverse consequences for employment.  If wages grew but employment was unaffected, 
we would expect that output would not have been affected either.  We would, however, expect profits to 
be adversely affected.  Table 6 shows that this is the case. While output growth for the treatment group 
was not significantly different than other enterprises, profits were significantly and negatively affected.  
Growth in profitability for foreign textiles and apparel firms in the treatment districts was 14 to 16 
percentage points (of value-added) lower than for other similar plants.  Lower growth in profits appeared 
to be linked to lower growth in capital stock, at least for foreign TFA plants in treatment districts.  These 
same plants also exhibited lower productivity growth.  
The last two columns of Table 5 seek to disentangle the extent to which the treatment group was 
associated with higher wage growth simply because those firms exhibited higher compliance with the 
rising minimum wage.  To do this, we add a triple interaction term between foreign, TREATMENT, and 
the minimum wage gap.  If all of the impact of activism was to increase compliance with the minimum 
wage, then this interaction term should capture that effect and the coefficient on foreign*TREATMENT 
should become small in magnitude and insignificant.  The results in column (9) show that this is not the 
case.  The coefficient on foreign*TREATMENT remains significant and the magnitude does not change, 
indicating that there is an independent impact of activism on wage growth apart from minimum wage 
compliance.  Although the coefficient on the triple interaction is large in magnitude, it is not significant, 
indicating that there was also likely to have been higher compliance with the existing minimum wage 
associated with treatment.  In column (10) we add the triple interaction to the standard employment 
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regressions from Table 5.  Again, the inclusion of the additional term does not affect the results, 
suggesting that while activism was associated with additional wage growth it was not associated with 
greater employment declines, or with falling employment stemming from more vigilant compliance with 
the minimum wage. 
Exit and Entry Finally, in Table 7 we explore whether the pressures imposed by anti-sweatshop 
activists have induced more firms to close down operations and exit the sector or discouraged entry.  We 
estimate the probability of exit in period t+1 as a function of plant and worker characteristics in period t, 
using annual data from 1988 through 1996.  If the pressures imposed by either higher minimum wages or 
anti-sweatshop activities led to higher exit or relocation abroad, then the benefits of higher wages could 
be offset by a higher probability of job loss.  We begin with the whole sample, with results from a probit 
estimation of the likelihood of exit reported in column (1) of Table 7.    For the whole sample, there is no 
evidence that exporters or foreign firms in districts with anti-sweatshop activism are more likely to shut 
down.  In fact, foreign plants in general are less likely to exit.  Foreign plants producing textiles and 
apparel sectors and located in the treatment districts are also less likely to exit: 2 percent less likely than 
other plants.  These lower probabilities of exit for foreign enterprises are consistent with the unconditional 
exit probabilities depicted in Figure 8, which do not control for plant characteristics.  However, higher 
minimum wages did increase the probability of exit, with a 10 percent increase in the real minimum wage 
leading to a higher probability of plant exit by .8 percent.   
In a recent paper, Bernard and Sjoholm (2004) point out that not taking into account the size of a 
plant is misleading, because small plants are much more likely to exit than large plants.  In particular, 
they point out that in the Indonesian data, plants with less than 20 workers were eliminated from the 
sample after 1989, changing the composition of the sample in favor of larger plants, which are less likely 
to exit.  One possibility is that exporters and foreign plants in textiles and apparel are less likely to exit 
because they are significantly larger than other plants.  To address this possibility, in the second column 
we only include plants with at least 100 workers.  The coefficients are unaffected; foreign firms in the   27 
treatment group were significantly less likely to exit during the sample period.  Minimum wages have 
about the same impact as before, raising exit probabilities significantly.   
    Interestingly, our results are somewhat different from Bernard and Sjoholm (2004), who find 
that foreign plants in Indonesia are more footloose than other plants.  Our results suggest that foreign 
plants are less footloose.  This could be because the number of foreign enterprises in Indonesia in the 
1980s—Bernard and Sjoholm examine data which ends in 1989—was small and consequently a few 
plants could lead to large rates of entry and exit.  Our data focuses on the 1990s, when there were more 
foreign plants in Indonesia. 
  In column (3) we turn to an analysis of plants with less than 100 employees.  In general, small 
exporters are 4 percentage points more likely to exit than small large firms.  However, there is no 
evidence that smaller plants operating in districts with anti-sweatshop activism were more likely to close.  
In columns (4) and (5), we restrict the sample to plants producing only textiles, footwear and apparel.  
The results are unaffected.   The next 5 columns remove controls for worker characteristics.  Since worker 
characteristics are only recorded for three years in the 1990s, including worker characteristics restricts the 
sample to firms that either do not exit or that exit after 1995, when worker characteristics were first 
recorded.  In this larger sample, the evidence is consistent with lower probability of exit for foreign 
enterprises, including both TFA and non-TFA foreign plants.  While all foreign enterprises were less 
likely to exit than other enterprises during the sample period, foreign TFA plants operating in districts 
with anti-sweatshop activity where even less likely to exit than other foreign plants. These results are 
again consistent with the unconditional exit probabilities evident for plants with foreign participation, as 
indicated in Figure 8. 
  However, in this larger sample, the evidence is consistent with higher exit probabilities for 
exporters in the treatment group.  While exporters in general were not more likely to exit, exporters 
operating in the treatment districts were significantly more likely to exit, with a 3 percent higher 
probability of exiting compared to other enterprises.  If the sample is restricted to exporters with fewer 
than 100 employees, the differential is even larger.  Exporters of textiles and apparel products in the   28 
treatment districts were 10 percent more likely to exit during this period, a significantly higher probability 
of exit which is consistent with the unconditional exit probabilities depicted in Figure 8.   
One possibility is that TFA exporters are simply are more volatile, exhibiting higher rates of entry 
as well.  Figure 9 shows that this is not the case.  During the 1990s, not only were TFA plants more likely 
to exit, but entry rates also dropped as well.  As indicated in Figure 9, higher rates of entry by TFA plants 
in the late 1980s than other plants were followed by a fall in entry rates, which by the end of the 1990s 
were comparable to non-TFA plants.  Other probit regressions (not shown) confirms that there was less 
entry into textiles and apparel, particularly among exporters.  If entry fell and exit rates rose for exporting 
TFA plants, how can we account for the fact that total employment in TFA plants did not fall?  In other 
words, how can we explain that TFA unskilled employment as a percentage of total manufacturing 
employment increased at the same time that exit became proportionately higher?  The reason, as shown in 
Table 4, is that remaining TFA plants--particularly exporters and foreign-owned plants—increased 
unskilled employment by as much as fifty percent.  Employment increases within surviving plants 




During the 1990s, anti-sweatshop activists increased their efforts to improve working conditions 
and raise wages for workers in developing countries.  Indonesia, which had more Nike subcontractors 
than any other country apart from China, was  a primary target for these activists. At the same time, the 
Indonesian government (prompted by the U.S. government) greatly increased the minimum wage 
throughout Indonesia. This paper analyzes the impact of these two different types of interventions on 
labor market outcomes in Indonesian manufacturing. The results suggest that the more than doubling of 
the real value of the minimum wage resulted in a 35 percent increase in real wages for unskilled workers 
between 1990 and 1996. The anti-sweatshop campaigns also had a significant impact on wages. Our   29 
research suggests that unskilled real wages increased by an additional 20 percent for exporters and 
multinational plants in sweatshop industries, defined as textiles, footwear, and apparel (TFA).  
The combined effects of the minimum wage legislation and the anti-sweatshop campaigns led to 
more than a 50 percent increase in real wages and a doubling of nominal wages for unskilled workers at 
targeted exporting plants. One question which naturally arises is how this could possibly be achieved 
without adverse consequences for employment.
8   We examine whether these higher wages led firms to 
cut employment or shut down operations. Our results suggest that the minimum wage increases led to 
employment losses of as much as 10 percentage points for unskilled workers across all sectors in 
manufacturing. Surprisingly, however, anti-sweatshop activism did not have significant adverse effects on 
employment in the TFA sectors. The fact that wages soared and employment remained steady in textiles 
and apparel suggests that the anti-sweatshop movement had a positive impact on workers in these 
factories.  The different impact of these two approaches to addressing labor market conditions suggests 
that anti-sweatshop activism in Indonesia was a “win-win” situation. Despite the rising labor costs during 
this period, increased market demand for textile, footwear, and apparel products led to net employment 
increases in foreign and exporting firms. 
  Since our study focuses on a relatively small time period, such gains could be temporary. Foreign 
firms such as Nike have already begun shifting production to other low-wage countries throughout 
Southeast Asia, such as China, Vietnam, and Cambodia.  It also remains an open question as to whether 
activism targeted at other sectors in Indonesia could be as successful. Wages in apparel and garment 
factories were very low prior to the onset of the anti-sweatshop campaigns.  This meant that 
subcontractors for Nike were able to implement significant wage increases before even approaching the 
average wages across the Indonesian manufacturing sector.  One implication is that anti-sweatshop 
activists correctly targeted some of the lowest paid workers in the country. Another key consideration is 
                                                            
8  It is important to keep in mind that for a well-known brand name such as Nike, labor costs from developing 
country factories in 1998 only accounted for about 4 percent of the total cost of a ninety dollar shoe. The internet 
link is http://cbae.nmsu.edu/~dboje/NIKfaqcompensation.html  This interview with Nike is from 1998, but is no 
longer part of Nike’s “official” website.    30 
that many of the goods produced in Indonesia’s TFA sectors ultimately end up in expensive retail markets 
in the U.S. and the EU, where profit margins are relatively large, brand identity is paramount, and the 
firms clearly have the financial resources with which to improve both labor conditions in their factories
9. 
In industries where more firms compete for market share, where profit margins are smaller, and there is 


























                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
9 One only needs to witness the many millions of dollars Nike has spent on trying to improve worker conditions as 
well as the money it has spent on public relations campaigns to improve its image. Nike employs 85 people full-time   31 
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Figure 3: Percentage of Articles on Sweatshops or Child Labor in Indonesia Relative to all 
Other Articles on the Indonesian Economy in the NYT
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Figure 4: Trends in the Indonesian Minimum Wage  
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Table 1A: Average Production Worker Wages per Establishment in 1990 and 1996 
In Thousands of 1996 Indonesian Rupiahs (Standard Errors in ()) 
 
 
  Ownership Status  Difference 
 
  Domestic (a)  Always 
Foreign (b) 
Always 
Exporting (c)  (2) – (1)  (3)-(1)  (2)-(3) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
1.  Mean Wage in 1990,    
     All Available 














2.  Mean Wage in 1996,  
     All Available  














3.  Change in Mean 














4.  Change in Mean     
     Wage, Balanced    













5.  Mean Change in Log   














6.  Mean Change in Log 
     Wage, Balanced   


















Textiles, Apparel, and Footwear 




















(1)-(4)  (2)-(5)  (3)-(6) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
 
1.  Mean Wage in 1990, 



















2.  Mean Wage in 1996, 



















3.  Change in Mean 



















4.  Change in Mean Wage 
     Wage, Balanced   



















5.  Mean Change in Log 



















6.  Mean Change in Log  
     Wage, Balanced 




















(a) A plant that is neither foreign owned nor exports the entire period. (b) Includes some foreign equity over the entire period. 
(c) Exports some share of output over the entire period. (d) Defined as establishments present in both 1990 and 1996. 
(e) Average of annual changes in establishments present in both 1990 and 1996 Table 2 
OLS Long Difference-in-Differences Estimation: Regressing Production Worker Wage Differences for 1990-1996 on the 
Minimum Wage Gap, Plant Characteristics, and Other Controls 
Dependent Variable: Log Plant Unskilled Wage in 1996 – Log Plant Unskilled Wage in 1990  
   
Robust t statistics in parentheses, with * indicating significance at 5 % and ** indicating significance at 1 %.   
(a) Includes some foreign equity over the entire period. 
(b) Exports some share of output over the entire period. 
(c) An establishment in the textiles, footwear, and apparel (TFA) sector in a district where Nike/Reebok/Adidas subcontractors operate. 
(d) Defined as the log of the minimum wage in 1996 less the log of the minimum wage in 1990, unless the plant pays above the 1996 minimum wage in 1990, in which case the 
minimum wage change is set equal to zero. 
 
 

































All  textiles, 
apparel and 
footwear firms 







Foreign (a)  0.093  0.033  0.077  0.082  0.060  0.059  0.042  .060  0.026  0.042 
  (1.80) 
 
(0.52)  (1.18)  (1.30)  (0.94)  (0.97)  (0.14)  (1.24)  (0.34)  (0.53) 
Exporter (b)  -0.046  -0.041  -0.024  -0.027  -0.038  -0.041  -0.762  -.040  -0.045  -0.118 
  (1.10) 
 
(1.02)  (0.47)  (0.55)  (0.75)  (0.80)  (3.18)**  (-.64)  (0.88)  (3.12)** 
TREATMENT  0.029  0.011  0.032  0.027  0.030  0.031  -1.560  -.010  0.012  0.155 
(c)  (0.61) 
 
(0.20)  (1.03)  (0.88)  (0.98)  (0.97)  (2.48)*  (-.20)  (0.15)  (4.60)** 
Foreign*  0.146  0.216  0.192  0.189  0.210  0.196  0.000  .180  0.212  0.126 
TREATMENT  (2.66)* 
 
(3.32)**  (3.33)**  (3.22)**  (3.39)**  (3.06)**  (0.0)  (3.73)**  (2.08)*  (0.65) 
Exporting*  0.080  0.079  0.063  0.068  0.074  0.077  0.000  .074  0.064  0.001 
TREATMENT  (1.74) 
 
(1.04)  (0.79)  (0.87)  (0.99)  (1.11)  (0.0)  (.84)  (0.73)  (0.00) 
Minimum   0.542  0.504  0.662  0.658  0.672  0.670  -0.353  .670  0.670  0.155 
Wage (d)  (9.71)** 
 
(10.11)**  (7.48)**  (7.45)**  (7.60)**  (7.54)**  (1.74)  (7.47)**  (8.67)**  (3.59)** 
Constant  0.001  0.063  0.185  0.145  0.124  0.086  0.919  .350  -1.325  0.356 
  (0.06) 
 
(3.40)**  (4.52)**  (3.58)**  (3.33)**  (2.23)*  (4.15)**  (7.20)**  (5.14)**  (19.63)** 
Obs  6165 
 
6165  6165  5920  5920  5920  5099  5099  535  5099 
R-squared  0.11  0.20  0.22  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.39  .25  0.27  0.08   1 
Table 3 
 
Additional Tests of Robustness: Substituting Different Treatment Groups and Matching Estimators 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Plant Unskilled Wage in 1996 – Log Plant Unskilled Wage in 1990  
 
   
Tests of Robustness: Switching from 
 Textiles, Footwear, and Apparel  to Other Industrial Sectors or Districts 
 
Tests of Robustness: Estimating Average Treatment Effect 
Using Matching Estimators for Treatment 































Foreign  0.081  0.086  0.092  0.084  --  --  --  -- 
  (1.16) 
 
(1.19)  (1.29)  (1.23)         
Exporter  -0.022  -0.017  -0.022  -0.022  --  --  --  -- 
  (0.61) 
 
(0.50)  (0.62)  (0.61)         
TREATMENT  0.079  0.267  0.099  0.001  --  --  --  -- 
  (2.92)** 
 
(9.39)**  (2.89)**  (0.05)         
TREATMENT  0.002  -0.009  -0.263  0.007  0.274  --  0.201  -- 
*Foreign  (0.02) 
 
(0.03)  (3.19)**  (0.10)  (2.23)**    (1.8)   
TREATMENT*  -0.206  -0.460  -0.411  -0.063  --  0.219    0.190 
Exporting  (3.19)** 
 
(4.07)**  (7.70)**  (0.84)    (2.11)**  --  (2.11)** 
Observations  5920  5920  5920  5920         
R-squared  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.23         
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses         




  Difference 
 
  Domestic (a)  Always 
Foreign (b) 
Always 
Exporting (c)  (2) – (1)  (3)-(1)  (2)-(3) 
 
1. Mean Employment in 
    1990, All Available 













2. Mean Employment in  
    1996, All Available   














3. Change in Mean 
    Employment, 1990-   














4. Change in Mean  
    Employment, Balanced 













5. Change in Mean Log 
    Employment, All 













6. Change in Mean Log 
    Employment, Balanced 















(a) A plant that is neither foreign owned nor exports the entire period.(b) Includes some foreign equity over the entire period. 
(c) Exports some share of output over the entire period. (d) Defined as establishments present in both 1990 and 1996. 




Textiles, Apparel, and Footwear 
Establishments 




















(1)-(4)  (2)-(5)  (3)-(6) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
 
1.  Mean Employment in 
    1990,  All Available 



















2.  Mean Employment in 
     1996, All Available 



















3.  Change in Mean 



















4.  Change in Mean 
     Employment, Balanced 



















5.  Change in Mean Log 
     Employment, All 



















6.  Change in Mean Log 
      Employment, Balanced 
































































Panel   
Foreign (a)  0.030  0.018  0.009  0.062  -0.011  -0.051  -0.149  0.033  0.011 
  (1.27) 
 
(0.62)  (0.37)  (0.72)  (0.44)  (1.40)  (33.1)**  (4.81)**  (1.63) 
Exporter (b)  0.055  0.053  0.030  0.049  0.011  0.091  0.067  0.007  0.002 
  (1.82) 
 
(1.73)  (1.07)  (0.51)  (0.34)  (1.73)  (1.83)  (1.31)  (0.37) 
TREATMENT   0.007  0.011  0.013  0.017  -0.003  0.015  -0.024  0.006  0.003 
(c)  (0.31) 
 
(0.55)  (1.17)  (0.21)  (0.37)  (0.52)  (0.85)  (1.43)  (0.92) 
TREATMENT*  0.111  0.119  0.034  0.000  0.044  0.087  0.134  -0.013  0.003 
Foreign  (2.14)* 
 
(2.18)*  (1.16)  (0.0)  (1.59)  (2.17)*  (7.17)**  (1.58)  (0.42) 
TREATMENT*  0.173  0.166  0.158  0.000  0.165  0.095  0.082  0.026  0.035 
Exporting  (5.02)** 
 
(5.07)**  (4.92)**  (0.0)  (5.40)**  (1.33)  (1.49)  (2.95)**  (5.51)** 





(8.04)**  (9.39)**  (0.80)  (8.67)**  (5.31)**  (7.75)**  (7.23)**  (3.37)** 
Observations  6165 
 
5920  5920  905  5015  1123  535  68875  33302 
R-Square  0.24  0.25  0.34  0.21  0.34  0.48  0.54  0.19  0.15 
                   
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses, with * indicating significance at 5 % and ** indicating significance at 1 %.   
(a) Includes some foreign equity over the entire period. 
(b) Exports some share of output over the entire period. 
(c) An establishment in the textiles, footwear, and apparel (TFA) sector in a district where Nike subcontractors operate.. 
(d) Defined as the log of the minimum wage in 1996 less the log of the minimum wage in 1990, unless the plant pays above the 1996 minimum wage in 1990, in which case the 







Regressing Production Worker Employment on Determinants (Standard Errors in ()) 
Dependent Variable: Log Employment in 1996 – Log Employment in 1990 for columns(1)-(7) and First Differences for columns (8)-(9) 
 
 
   1 
Table 6 
The Impact of Treatment on Other Outcomes (Output Growth, Change in Capital Stock, TFPG, and Profits) 
Dependent Variable indicated in columns:  
Robust t statistics in parentheses, with * indicating significance at 5 % and ** indicating significance at 1 %.   
(a) Includes some foreign equity over the entire period. 
(b) Exports some share of output over the entire period. 
(c) An establishment in the textiles, footwear, and apparel (TFA) sector in a district where Nike/Reebok/Adidas subcontractors operate.. 
(d) Defined as the log of the minimum wage in 1996 less the log of the minimum wage in 1990, unless the plant pays above the 1996 minimum wage in 1990, in which case the 
minimum wage change is set equal to zero. 























































Foreign (a)  0.241  0.334  0.388  0.121  -0.008  0.157  0.018  0.000  .059  .015 
  (2.24)* 
 
(2.47)*  (6.70)**  (0.70)  (0.23)  (3.54)**  (1.45)  (0.0)  (.060)  (.025) 
Exporter (b)  0.057  0.033  -0.038  0.156  -0.012  -0.022  -0.013  0.003  -.041  .029 
  (0.80) 
 
(0.19)  (0.61)  (1.62)  (0.73)  (0.32)  (-1.74)  (0.10)  (.051)  (.026) 
TREATMENT  -0.065  0.078  0.074  0.176  0.005  0.044  0.030  0.031  .030  .015 
(c)  (0.80) 
 
(0.91)  (1.68)  (2.83)*  (0.38)  (1.64)  (3.20)**  (7.18)**  (0.96)  (.014) 
Foreign *  0.157  0.093  -0.275  0.020  0.008  -0.155  -0.141  -0.124  0.202**  .026 
TREATMENT  (1.57) 
 
(0.70)  (-4.26)**  (0.12)  (0.21)  (-3.04)**  (-7.65)**  (-4.33)**  (.068)  (.032) 
Export *  0.335  0.309  0.204  -0.024  0.012  0.020  -0.019  -0.030  -0.35  .293** 









(d)                     
Observations  6165  1173  6165  1173  5920  1123  4854  898  5920  5920 
R-squared  0.03  0.09  0.03  0.10  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.22  0.32   2 
Robust z statistics in parentheses.  A “*” indicates significance at 5%; ** significance at the 1% level.  Reported coefficients are the change in the probability of 







Determinants of Exit: Probit Regressions, 
1988-1996 (Coefficients are Derivatives) 
   
Includes Controls for Educational Attainment of Employees 
 
 
Excludes Controls for Educational Attainment of Employees 




















































Footwear   
Foreign  -0.009  -0.002  -0.015  -0.006  0.000  -0.042  -0.018  -0.049  -0.059  -0.032 
  (2.57)*  (0.62)  (2.20)*  (1.57)  (0.02)  (7.98)**  (3.53)**  (6.48)**  (8.34)**  (4.80)** 
Exporter  0.005  -0.001  0.034  0.001  0.000  -0.031  -0.022  0.009  -0.026  -0.009 
  (0.72)  (0.26)  (3.12)**  (0.10)  (0.02)  (2.49)*  (2.15)*  (0.53)  (1.24)  (0.93) 
TREATMENT  0.004  0.012  -0.004  -0.006  -0.000  0.006  0.021  0.001  -0.018  0.002 
  (0.91)  (6.02)**  (0.69)  (0.83)  (0.13)  (0.61)  (3.27)**  (0.05)  (0.90)  (0.18) 
Foreign*  -0.017  -0.016  ..  -0.021  -0.016  -0.030  -0.033  ..  -0.015  -0.029 
TREATMENT  (2.35)*  (3.89)**    (1.84)  (2.43)*  (1.87)  (2.94)**    (0.72)  (2.00)* 
Exporting*  -0.002  -0.002  0.006  0.005  0.001  0.036  0.018  0.098  0.031  0.002 
TREATMENT  (0.33)  (0.31)  (0.48)  (0.32)  (0.08)  (2.30)*  (1.56)  (2.87)**  (1.28)  (0.16) 
Change in   0.071  0.055  0.081  0.082  0.052  0.075  0.066  0.073  0.063  0.057 
Minimum 
Wage 
(2.48)*  (3.03)**  (2.31)*  (2.39)*  (2.88)**  (3.15)**  (2.87)**  (3.22)**  (2.42)*  (2.12)* 
Observations  81840  28438  53219  15847  7004  92907  30904  61968  18260  7653 
                     3 






















All real values are base 1996 
MW=minimum wage 
Prod=production worker 
TFA=textile, apparel, or footwear sector 
All Indonesian currency is in 1,000 rupiah 












            a. Non-TFA Wages 
            b. TFA Wages (Production 
Workers Only)          
Year  CPI 96  MWNom  MW96  MW$US   (ru/$)  Prod  Non-Prod  Dom / No X  Exporters  Foreign 
                     
1988  0.527  351  667  388  1717  1242  2935  1025  1325  2072 
1989  0.561  355  634  355  1787  1272  3137  1053  1461  2125 
1990  0.604  503  833  443  1882  1288  3154  1078  1462  1755 
1991  0.661  633  957  484  1982  1352  3351  1120  1417  1685 
1992  0.711  717  1008  492  2051  1479  3567  1239  1604  1931 
1993  0.780  832  1066  509  2095  1537  3769  1278  1732  1846 
1994  0.846  1193  1409  652  2160  1610  3775  1310  1888  2015 
1995  0.926  1418  1531  684  2239  1665  3921  1346  1971  2063 
1996  1.000  1560  1560  644  2348  1752  4017  1441  2079  2269 
1997  1.067  1699  1592  539  2953  1858  4870  1515  2723  2499 
1998  1.680  1963  1167  118  9875  1589  4010  1287  1808  2347 
1999  2.027  2308  1138  146  7809  1645  4926  1220  2037  2528 